4 found
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  1. (1 other version)¿Intuición o confianza racional?Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 2 (5):49-71.
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  2. Antiexcepcionalismo humano y el problema de la identidad.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2021 - Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética 16:1-10.
    El posthumanismo es un término que engloba numerosos análisis teóricos con un denominador común: el excepcionalismo humano, es decir, la posición privilegiada del ser humano respecto al resto del universo. El propósito de este artículo es analizar hasta qué punto la estructura no naturalista de lo humano ha difuminado la distinción tradicional entre lo humano y lo que no es humano y, al mismo tiempo, presentar brevemente el desacuerdo existente dentro del posthumanismo. El objetivo es cuestionar las múltiples formas en (...)
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  3. Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.
    A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian’s a prioriview. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role semantics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian’s view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I analyse several arguments to show (...)
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  4. Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2018 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2):70-82.
    In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped (...)
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